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The	  territorial	  politics	  of	  health	  is	  both	  underexploited	  by	  mainstream	  political	  
scientists	  and	  the	  subject	  of	  a	  large	  and	  distinctive	  health	  policy	  literature	  that	  
rarely	  connects	  with	  political	  science.	  This	  chapter	  first	  argues	  for	  the	  usefulness	  of	  
health	  as	  a	  source	  of	  data	  for	  a	  more	  grounded	  and	  policy-­‐focused	  territorial	  
politics.	  It	  then	  summarizes	  the	  health	  policy	  approach	  to	  territorial	  politics,	  arguing	  
that	  its	  empirical	  findings,	  more	  than	  its	  theories,	  can	  enrich	  political	  science	  on	  the	  
topic.	  Subsequently,	  it	  turns	  to	  the	  findings	  of	  political	  scientists,	  highlighting	  the	  
extent	  to	  which	  comparative	  welfare	  state	  literature	  is	  skeptical	  about	  federalism	  
and	  could	  handle	  it	  much	  better,	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  literature	  about	  
federalism	  and	  health	  is	  mostly	  nationally	  specific	  and	  overrepresents	  North	  
American	  experiences.	  The	  last	  sections	  turn	  to	  some	  findings	  for	  comparative	  
territorial	  politics	  from	  health	  policy	  studies,	  and	  some	  potential	  future	  directions	  
for	  research.	  	  
	  
	   	  




Health	  policy	  is	  both	  an	  important	  and	  a	  frustrating	  topic	  for	  research	  in	  territorial	  
politics.	  It	  is	  important	  because	  in	  many	  countries	  it	  is,	  along	  with	  education,	  one	  of	  
the	  most	  important	  expenditure	  items	  for	  local	  and	  regional	  government.	  To	  write	  
about	  states	  in	  Brazil	  or	  the	  U.S.,	  regions	  in	  Italy	  or	  Spain,	  or	  devolved	  authorities	  in	  
the	  UK	  without	  writing	  about	  health	  is	  to	  ignore	  a	  huge	  part	  of	  what	  they	  do	  and	  
what	  their	  politicians	  must	  think	  about.	  	  
	   Furthermore,	  study	  of	  health	  and	  territorial	  politics	  could	  shed	  light	  on	  some	  
of	  the	  knottiest	  problems	  in	  comparative	  politics.	  For	  territorial	  politics	  scholars,	  
understanding	  health	  better	  would	  mean	  not	  just	  understanding	  one	  of	  the	  most	  
important	  areas	  of	  public	  expenditure,	  but	  also	  would	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  kinds	  of	  
variation	  that	  are	  common	  in	  decentralized	  states	  but	  obscured	  by	  a	  focus	  on	  
legislation.	  Such	  variation	  happens,	  and	  matters,	  in	  organization,	  budgeting,	  staffing,	  
and	  priorities	  within	  the	  public	  sector.	  Studying	  health	  also	  opens	  up	  new	  empirical	  
approaches	  to	  problems	  in	  territorial	  politics	  such	  as	  the	  challenges	  of	  multi-­‐level	  
coordination	  and	  the	  diffusion	  of	  ideas	  and	  learning.	  For	  scholars	  in	  social	  policy	  
and	  comparative	  political	  economy,	  understanding	  health	  care	  and	  policy	  better	  
would	  free	  them	  from	  a	  tendency	  to	  focus	  on	  pensions	  and	  unemployment	  
insurance	  as	  representations	  of	  the	  whole	  welfare	  state	  (e.g.(Esping-­‐Andersen	  1990,	  
Hicks	  1999)	  and	  come	  to	  grips	  with	  the	  complexity	  and	  complex	  knowledge	  politics	  
that	  characterize	  the	  modern	  state	  (Jasanoff	  2004a).	  
	   Health	  is	  also	  a	  frustrating	  topic,	  particularly	  for	  comparative	  research.	  
Compared	  to	  other	  policy	  areas,	  part	  of	  the	  problem	  is	  that	  it	  is	  so	  difficult	  to	  
characterize	  programs	  or	  understand	  causality.	  For	  example,	  we	  can	  calculate	  
expenditure	  on	  unemployment	  or	  pensions	  by	  multiplying	  unemployment	  pay	  or	  
pensions	  by	  the	  number	  of	  people	  legally	  entitled	  to	  them.	  In	  health,	  calculating	  
need,	  desires,	  expenditure,	  or	  entitlement	  is	  very	  difficult.	  If	  everybody	  is	  essentially	  
entitled	  to	  health	  care	  then	  variations	  in	  expenditure	  might	  be	  down	  to	  changing	  
need,	  changing	  technologies,	  changing	  efficiency,	  discrimination,	  or	  budgeting	  
decisions	  by	  politicians	  and	  managers.	  Entire	  careers	  are	  rightly	  dedicated	  to	  
parsing	  out	  these	  factors,	  which	  means	  that	  quick	  policy	  analysis	  or	  comparison	  is	  
very	  difficult.	  Furthermore,	  the	  health	  sector	  has	  a	  large	  set	  of	  articulate	  policy	  
actors	  and	  analysts	  who	  generate	  both	  layers	  of	  complexity	  and	  their	  own	  analytic	  
frameworks	  that	  compete	  with	  political	  scientists’.	  
	   The	  result	  is	  that	  research	  in	  territorial	  politics	  could	  and	  should	  derive	  a	  
great	  deal	  of	  data	  and	  insight	  by	  examining	  the	  ways	  policymakers	  handle	  health,	  
but	  faces	  a	  series	  of	  obstacles	  as	  basic	  as	  working	  out	  how	  much	  health	  care	  is	  being	  
provided	  in	  two	  different	  jurisdictions.	  How	  has	  the	  challenge	  been	  handled?	  	  
	   For	  political	  scientists,	  the	  answer	  is	  probably:	  not	  frequently	  enough.	  For	  
health	  policy	  researchers,	  the	  answer	  is	  probably:	  not	  well	  enough.	  This	  chapter	  
starts	  with	  a	  quick	  discussion	  of	  health	  policy	  specialist	  literature,	  sketching	  their	  
preoccupations	  and	  approaches,	  before	  turning	  to	  the	  insights	  into	  and	  use	  of	  health	  
policy	  by	  territorial	  politics	  scholars.	  Concern	  about	  health	  in	  territorial	  politics	  is	  
focused	  on	  health	  care,	  is	  mostly	  in	  dialogue	  with	  welfare	  state	  literature	  focused	  on	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the	  generosity	  and	  structure	  of	  welfare	  states,	  and	  does	  not	  always	  connect	  well	  
with	  other	  literatures.	  Some	  of	  the	  best	  scholarship	  is	  concentrated	  in	  and	  on	  a	  the	  
United	  States	  and	  Canada,	  which	  means	  that	  there	  is	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  scope	  for	  work	  
outside	  those	  countries,	  or	  putting	  them	  into	  perspective.	  The	  final	  section	  focuses	  
on	  some	  key	  and	  possibly	  internationally	  generalizable	  findings	  from	  those	  
countries	  before	  a	  conclusion	  offers	  a	  critique	  and	  suggestion	  of	  new	  directions.	  	  
	  
Territorial	  politics	  in	  health	  policy	  
	  
A	  political	  scientist,	  encountering	  the	  literature	  on	  territorial	  politics	  and	  health	  for	  
the	  first	  time,	  will	  notice	  that	  most	  people	  who	  publish	  on	  the	  topic	  come	  from	  
health	  backgrounds,	  write	  in	  health	  journals,	  address	  health	  policy	  audiences,	  and	  
tend	  to	  share	  some	  distinctive	  conceptual	  approaches.	  This	  is	  emblematic	  of	  the	  
relationship	  between	  political	  science	  and	  health:	  a	  lack	  of	  interest	  in	  the	  topic	  
among	  conventional	  political	  scientists,	  who	  leave	  the	  wealth	  of	  experience	  in	  the	  
health	  sector	  largely	  untouched,	  juxtaposed	  with	  a	  distinctive	  health	  policy	  
literature	  whose	  concerns	  and	  development	  are	  essentially	  separate	  and	  lead	  in	  
some	  unexpected	  directions	  (for	  critiques	  of	  the	  health	  policy	  discussion	  of	  
territorial	  politics,	  (Adolph,	  Greer,	  and	  Massard	  da	  Fonseca	  2012,	  Greer	  and	  
Massard	  da	  Fonseca	  2015,	  Peckham	  et	  al.	  2007).	  
First,	  the	  literature	  in	  health	  tends	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  
“decentralization”	  rather	  than	  federalism	  or	  territorial	  politics	  (Saltman,	  
Bankauskaite,	  and	  Vrangbaek	  2007).	  Decentralization,	  unlike	  federalism	  or	  
territorial	  politics,	  implies	  an	  action	  taken	  by	  somebody	  central	  for	  an	  instrumental	  
reason.	  This	  linguistic	  choice	  marks	  a	  decidedly	  technocratic	  style	  common	  in	  the	  
literature,	  and	  reflects	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  bulk	  of	  literature	  on	  decentralization	  in	  
health	  care	  comes	  out	  of	  global	  health	  research	  on	  the	  best	  means	  of	  delivering	  
health	  services	  and	  development	  in	  low	  or	  middle	  income	  countries.	  In	  such	  
literature,	  authors	  are	  often	  addressing	  governments,	  donors,	  finance	  ministries,	  or	  
international	  financial	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  World	  Bank,	  and	  accordingly	  deliver	  
advice	  suited	  to	  those	  actors’	  interests.	  At	  its	  best,	  the	  result	  is	  advice	  for	  ministers	  
and	  constitution-­‐writers,	  most	  of	  it	  derived	  from	  the	  economics	  of	  fiscal	  federalism	  
(Boadway	  and	  Shah	  2009).	  
Second,	  the	  literature	  comes	  with	  a	  lack	  of	  interest	  in	  the	  distinctions	  
between	  different	  kinds	  of	  political	  phenomena	  that	  political	  scientists	  might	  find	  
surprising.	  Health	  policy	  writers	  recurrently	  cite	  Dennis	  Rondinelli,	  a	  public	  
management	  researcher	  associated	  with	  the	  World	  Bank,	  for	  his	  taxonomy	  of	  
decentralization	  (Rondinelli	  1981,	  1983),	  which	  was	  also	  adopted	  in	  a	  very	  
influential	  1990	  World	  Bank	  paper	  (Mills	  et	  al.	  1990).	  Rondinelli’s	  taxonomy,	  which	  
in	  its	  various	  published	  forms	  has	  thousands	  of	  citations,	  divides	  decentralization	  
into	  four:	  deconcentration,	  which	  means	  moving	  central	  government	  work	  out	  of	  
the	  capital;	  delegation,	  which	  means	  entrusting	  smaller	  units	  with	  centrally	  set	  
responsibilities;	  devolution,	  which	  means	  transferring	  areas	  of	  responsibility	  to	  
regional	  or	  local	  governments;	  and	  privatization,	  which	  means	  transfer	  of	  a	  
responsibility	  to	  the	  private	  sector.	  The	  distinction	  between	  delegation	  and	  
devolution	  seems	  to	  blur	  in	  theory	  and	  practice.	  In	  other	  words,	  one	  concept,	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decentralization,	  includes	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Scottish	  Parliament,	  the	  sale	  of	  
British	  Telecom,	  and	  the	  decision	  to	  locate	  the	  UK’s	  agency	  for	  driver	  and	  car	  
registration	  in	  Wales.	  What	  they	  have	  in	  common	  is	  what	  interests	  the	  World	  Bank,	  
rather	  than	  what	  interests	  scholars	  of	  politics:	  they	  shrink	  the	  central	  state.	  Not	  
many	  political	  scientists	  have	  tried	  to	  use	  a	  framework	  that	  juxtaposes	  such	  
different	  phenomena	  and	  when	  one	  did,	  the	  results	  were	  predictably	  abstract	  and	  
banal	  (Lemieux	  2001).	  
Even	  in	  health	  policy	  accounts	  that	  focus	  on	  territorial	  decentralization	  alone	  
(devolution,	  in	  Rondinelli’s	  taxonomy),	  there	  is	  a	  tendency	  to	  blur	  conventional	  
distinctions	  political	  scientists	  make-­‐	  between	  elected	  and	  unelected	  governments,	  
between	  local	  governments	  and	  federal	  states,	  between	  single-­‐purpose	  and	  general	  
governments.	  Analyses	  of	  trends	  in	  decentralization	  can,	  as	  a	  result,	  incorporate	  
recentralization	  of	  Scandinavian	  (local)	  health	  services,	  a	  reorganization	  of	  the	  
French	  health	  system	  that,	  as	  David	  Jones	  points	  out,	  was	  actually	  centralizing,	  
(Jones	  2013)	  and	  devolution	  in	  the	  UK	  as	  similar	  processes.	  Such	  an	  analysis	  
predictably	  produces	  somewhat	  confusing	  results	  (Saltman	  2008).	   
An	  approach	  with	  these	  two	  characteristics	  of	  technocracy	  and	  limited	  
discrimination	  among	  types	  is	  unlikely	  to	  contribute	  much	  to	  comparative	  politics.	  
It	  is	  almost	  deliberately	  insensitive	  to	  political	  institutions	  and	  processes.	  It	  is	  a	  
breath	  of	  fresh	  air	  relative	  to	  the	  economic	  modeling	  with	  which	  it	  frequently	  
argues,	  but	  is	  conceptually	  underdeveloped	  as	  political	  science.	  It	  would	  bear	  some	  
study	  by	  the	  scholars	  who	  examine	  the	  intertwined	  power	  relations	  and	  social	  
construction	  in	  global	  health,	  development	  and	  “good	  governance”	  literatures	  
(Andrews	  2013,	  Ferguson	  1990).	  Its	  high	  modernist	  tone	  (Bevir	  2010),	  addressing	  a	  
sort	  of	  Prince	  (or	  World	  Bank	  mission)	  who	  can	  engineer	  rules,	  societies,	  and	  
incentives,	  is	  so	  unrealistic	  as	  to	  draw	  attention	  towards	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  
such	  scholarship	  rather	  than	  its	  findings.	  	  	  
What	  the	  health	  policy	  literature	  does	  bring	  to	  political	  science	  is	  a	  fund	  of	  
empirical	  studies	  on	  the	  implications	  of	  decentralization,	  as	  health	  policy	  scholars	  
understand	  it.	  It	  is	  found	  in	  journals	  such	  as	  Health	  Policy	  and	  Planning	  as	  well	  as	  
the	  large	  grey	  literature	  of	  reports	  and	  government	  publications	  typical	  of	  
development	  and	  global	  health	  research.	  Properly	  interpreted,	  they	  offer	  a	  large	  
fund	  of	  research	  results	  on	  topics	  such	  as	  local	  engagement,	  budgeting,	  management	  
and	  health	  outcomes	  of	  changing	  authority	  structures,	  and	  corruption.	  There	  is	  very	  
little	  relationship	  between	  this	  literature	  and	  the	  still	  larger	  literature	  on	  health	  
inequalities	  of	  all	  kinds	  (Lynch	  2017),	  including	  spatial	  health	  inequalities,	  but	  that	  
would	  be	  an	  interesting	  direction	  for	  further	  research	  if	  we	  were	  able	  to	  match	  
useful	  political	  variables	  to	  the	  increasingly	  detailed	  territorial	  health	  data	  available	  
in	  rich	  countries.	  	  
There	  is	  also	  one	  clearly	  useful	  concept,	  developed	  by	  Bossert,	  which	  is	  the	  
idea	  of	  “decision	  spaces”	  (Bossert	  1998).	  Decision	  space	  is	  the	  “range	  of	  effective	  
choice	  that	  is	  allowed	  by	  the	  central	  authorities…	  to	  be	  used	  by	  the	  local	  authorities”	  
(p.1518).	  	  Bossert	  unfortunately	  goes	  on	  to	  adopt	  a	  principal-­‐agent	  model	  in	  which	  
local	  governments	  are	  the	  agents	  of	  central	  government.	  That	  is	  typical	  of	  the	  
technocratic	  bent	  of	  this	  scholarship,	  but	  quite	  unrealistic	  if	  we	  are	  trying	  to	  
characterize	  the	  relationship	  of	  California	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  let	  alone	  Sao	  Paulo	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and	  Brazil,	  let	  alone	  Quebec	  and	  Canada.	  The	  concept	  is	  nevertheless	  useful	  for	  its	  
potential	  to	  produce	  a	  picture	  of	  decentralization	  with	  practical	  implications	  and	  
precision	  beyond	  the	  best	  existing	  political	  science	  (Hooghe	  and	  Marks	  2015)	  and	  
has	  been	  put	  to	  good	  use,	  for	  example	  in	  international	  political	  economy	  (Koivusalo	  
2015).	  
	   	  
Health	  policy	  as	  comparative	  politics	  
	  
If	  the	  health	  policy	  research	  on	  territorial	  politics	  is	  voluminous,	  technocratic,	  and	  
conceptually	  underdeveloped,	  the	  comparative	  political	  science	  research	  on	  the	  
territorial	  politics	  of	  health	  is	  the	  reverse:	  small,	  politically	  focused	  and	  conceptual	  
(with	  few	  exceptions,	  e.g.	  (Fierlbeck	  and	  Palley	  2015a,	  Costa	  i	  Font	  and	  Greer	  2013).	  	  
	   The	  main	  international	  literature	  in	  political	  science	  that	  does	  handle	  
federalism	  and	  health	  is	  the	  comparative	  social	  policy	  and	  political	  economy	  
literature.	  Federalism	  appears	  in	  this	  literature	  essentially	  as	  a	  veto	  point,	  an	  
institutional	  barrier	  to	  welfare	  state	  growth	  or	  retrenchment.	  The	  most	  popular	  
approach	  codes	  it	  as	  a	  component	  of	  an	  institutional	  “fragmentation”	  variable	  
incorporating	  federalism,	  bicameralism,	  and	  other	  such	  institutional	  veto	  points.	  
The	  origins	  of	  this	  concept	  were	  in	  Evelyn	  Huber	  and	  John	  Stephens’	  development	  of	  
the	  concept	  of	  veto	  points	  as	  created	  by	  Ellen	  Immergut	  in	  her	  influential	  case	  
studies	  of	  French,	  Swedish	  and	  Swiss	  health	  policy	  development	  (Huber,	  Ragin,	  and	  
Stephens	  1993,	  Immergut	  1992)	  though	  it	  has	  close	  kinship	  with	  the	  work	  of	  other	  
political	  scientists	  who	  focus	  on	  institutional	  impediments	  to	  policymaking	  (Stepan	  
and	  Linz	  2011,	  Gerring	  and	  Thacker	  2008,	  Lijphart	  1999).	  Huber	  and	  Stephens	  
found	  that	  institutional	  fragmentation	  led	  to	  stingier	  welfare	  states	  across	  the	  board	  
(Huber	  and	  Stephens	  2001).	  When	  Castles	  and	  collaborators	  broke	  out	  federalism	  
as	  a	  specific	  variable,	  albeit	  in	  a	  remarkably	  crude	  treatment,	  they	  found	  that	  it	  did	  
correlate	  with	  less	  generous	  welfare	  states,	  though	  their	  research	  averaged	  data	  
across	  the	  whole	  postwar	  period	  and	  stopped	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  (Castles	  1999).	  
This	  macro-­‐comparative	  approach	  has	  some	  serious	  limitations.	  It	  is	  possible	  
to	  argue	  that	  Huber	  and	  Stephens	  are	  correlating	  an	  abstraction	  (a	  variable	  mixing	  
the	  unlike,	  such	  as	  referenda	  and	  federalism)	  with	  an	  average	  (since	  in	  an	  area	  like	  
health	  or	  education,	  the	  overall	  outcome	  might	  be	  the	  aggregate	  of	  regional	  
decisions)(Greer,	  Elliott,	  and	  Oliver	  2015).	  Snyder	  punned	  that	  such	  overuse	  of	  
averages	  to	  characterize	  policy	  results	  in	  decentralized	  states	  is	  “mean-­‐spirited	  
thinking”	  (Snyder	  2001).	  This	  problem	  means	  that	  it	  talks	  right	  past	  the	  smaller,	  and	  
more	  Europe-­‐focused,	  literature	  that	  focuses	  on	  the	  protagonism	  and	  actions	  of	  
individual	  regions	  and	  which	  is	  generally	  more	  positive	  about	  the	  contribution	  of	  
regional	  governments	  to	  welfare	  (McEwen	  and	  Moreno	  2005).	  There	  are	  also	  
serious	  mathematical	  problems	  in	  using	  regression	  techniques	  on	  an	  essentially	  
cross-­‐sectional	  analysis	  of	  a	  small	  number	  of	  countries	  (levels	  of	  decentralization	  
rarely	  change,	  so	  the	  autocorrelation	  problem	  prevents	  effective	  use	  of	  time-­‐series	  
analysis).	  Modern	  statistical	  techniques	  effectively	  prevent	  designing	  a	  study	  similar	  
to	  that	  of	  Castles	  and	  collaborator.	  The	  fact	  that	  this	  kind	  of	  research	  is	  small-­‐N,	  
autocorrelated	  and	  subject	  to	  omitted	  variable	  bias	  (every	  other	  variable	  associated	  
with	  a	  country	  might	  matter),	  combined	  with	  publication	  bias,	  probably	  explains	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why	  there	  has	  been	  no	  replication	  or	  extension	  of	  this	  work	  since	  1999.	  	  
	   Federalism	  might	  covary	  with	  less	  generous	  welfare	  states	  in	  comparative	  
quantitative	  studies,	  but	  the	  mechanisms	  are	  unclear.	  Is	  it	  because	  of	  covariates	  of	  
federalism	  such	  as	  bicameralism,	  or	  is	  it	  because	  of	  the	  countries	  that	  happen	  to	  be	  
federal,	  such	  as	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Switzerland	  and	  also	  happen	  to	  be	  weak	  on	  
other	  variables	  such	  as	  left	  parties	  that	  predict	  welfare	  state	  growth,	  or	  is	  it	  because	  
federal	  states	  use	  their	  representation	  in	  central	  states	  to	  undermine	  welfare	  
programs,	  or	  is	  it	  because	  governments	  within	  the	  federal	  state	  use,	  or	  are	  forced	  to	  
use,	  their	  autonomy	  to	  fund	  variable	  and	  less	  generous	  health	  and	  welfare	  programs	  
in	  a	  race	  to	  the	  bottom?	  When	  Castles	  and	  collaborators	  dug	  into	  the	  topic	  in	  an	  
extensive	  comparative-­‐historical	  inquiry,	  they	  found	  that	  history	  matters	  and	  that	  
federal	  states	  establish	  welfare	  states	  through	  clever	  bypasses	  of	  their	  federal	  
institutions	  (Obinger,	  Leibfried,	  and	  Castles	  2005).	  
It	  is	  hard	  to	  go	  much	  further	  with	  the	  macro-­‐comparative	  approach,	  for	  three	  
reasons.	  First,	  one	  of	  the	  limitations	  in	  applying	  the	  broader	  comparative	  political	  
economy	  literature	  to	  the	  topic	  of	  health	  is	  that	  health	  entitlements	  are	  intractable	  
in	  comparative	  analysis	  compared	  to	  pensions	  and	  other	  payments.	  In	  most	  health	  
systems	  there	  is	  no	  equivalent	  to	  the	  calculus	  of	  entitlement	  that	  governs	  pension	  or	  
unemployment	  expenditure.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  comparative	  politics	  of	  the	  welfare	  state	  
has	  a	  strong	  tendency	  to	  focus	  on	  pensions,	  which	  are	  typically	  state-­‐level,	  and	  pay	  
less	  attention	  to	  the	  areas	  such	  as	  health	  and	  education	  that	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  
involve	  decentralization	  and	  federalism.	  That	  is	  a	  convenience	  for	  scholars,	  but	  
creates	  a	  highly	  unrepresentative	  picture	  of	  welfare	  states	  and	  welfare	  state	  politics.	  	  
The	  second	  reason	  is	  methodological.	  Despite	  the	  best	  efforts	  of	  statisticians,	  
we	  only	  have	  about	  a	  dozen	  decentralized	  states	  in	  the	  OECD,	  and	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  do	  
much	  with	  that	  N.	  If	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Switzerland	  drive	  international	  
comparison	  towards	  a	  finding	  that	  federalism	  decreases	  welfare	  state	  expenditure	  
but	  correlates	  with	  very	  expensive	  health	  systems,	  as	  they	  do,	  is	  that	  a	  problem	  with	  
outliers	  or	  an	  accurate	  reflection	  of	  the	  world?	  	  
A	  third	  problem	  is	  conceptual.	  A	  concept	  like	  “fragmentation”	  mixes	  up	  
different	  (if	  correlated)	  concepts.	  At	  a	  minimum,	  causal	  stories	  and	  data	  should	  
distinguish	  between	  shared	  rule	  and	  self-­‐rule	  if	  they	  are	  to	  make	  sense	  (Elazar	  
1987).	  	  Shared	  rule	  refers	  to	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  regional	  governments	  play	  a	  role	  in	  
central	  state	  decision	  making.	  Self-­‐rule	  is	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  autonomy	  of	  those	  
governments	  to	  make	  their	  own	  decisions.	  In	  a	  federation	  with	  high	  self-­‐rule	  and	  
low	  shared	  rule,	  such	  as	  the	  UK	  or	  USA,	  it	  makes	  little	  sense	  to	  blame	  federalism	  for	  
the	  decisions	  of	  the	  central	  state	  (Greer	  2009).	  Far	  from	  being	  a	  hostage	  to	  states,	  
the	  U.S.	  federal	  political	  system	  is	  paying	  less	  and	  less	  attention	  to	  them	  (Lowery,	  
Gray,	  and	  Baumgartner	  2010).	  In	  a	  federation	  with	  high	  shared-­‐rule	  and	  limited	  
self-­‐rule,	  such	  as	  Germany	  or	  Austria,	  we	  can	  often	  regard	  federalism	  as	  primarily	  
an	  electoral	  system	  for	  central	  elections.	  	  
This	  set	  of	  problems	  push	  us	  towards	  disaggregation	  (of	  country	  outcomes	  
and	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  “decentralization”),	  towards	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  configuration	  of	  
causes	  rather	  the	  effect	  of	  some	  kind	  of	  “decentralization”	  or	  “federalism”	  variable,	  
towards	  greater	  clarity	  about	  mechanisms	  and	  institutions	  such	  that	  territorial	  
politics	  scholarship	  can	  provide	  and	  towards	  a	  qualitative	  comparative	  approach	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rather	  than	  a	  truncated	  quantitative	  approach	  that	  will	  always	  have	  a	  problem	  with	  
degrees	  of	  freedom,	  data	  quality,	  and	  mechanisms	  (Greer	  2018)	  	  
	  
Health	  politics	  as	  territorial	  politics:	  North	  American	  and	  comparative	  
approaches	  
	  
There	  are	  two	  large,	  coherent,	  and	  interesting	  literatures	  on	  territorial	  politics	  and	  
health.	  They	  are	  both	  North	  American,	  coming	  from	  Canada	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  
respectively.	  	  
	   Canada	  is	  probably	  an	  international	  outlier	  for	  the	  consistency	  and	  depth	  of	  
its	  political	  scientists’	  interest	  in	  both	  federalism	  and	  health	  policy.	  This	  presumably	  
reflects	  decades	  of	  Canadian	  political	  interest	  in	  the	  topic	  (including	  several	  Royal	  
Commissions	  and	  other	  inquiries	  into	  health,	  which	  focused	  debate	  and	  
commissioned	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  research)	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  nearly	  all	  politics	  in	  Canada	  
is	  territorial.	  The	  result	  is	  a	  large	  literature	  dating	  back	  decades	  and	  including	  some	  
of	  the	  highlights	  of	  comparative	  research	  on	  territorial	  politics	  and	  health	  (Banting	  
and	  Corbett	  2002,	  Tuohy	  1999,	  Maioni	  1998,	  Lazar	  et	  al.	  2013)(Fierlbeck	  
forthcoming).	  This	  scholarly	  effort	  includes	  serious	  comparisons	  of	  provinces	  as	  
complex	  political	  systems	  (Dunn	  2006),	  a	  Canadian	  genre	  with	  few	  equivalents	  
elsewhere,	  and	  a	  project	  to	  publish	  complete	  reports	  on	  provincial	  health	  systems	  
modeled	  on	  the	  European	  Observatory	  on	  Health	  Systems	  and	  Policies’	  series	  of	  
country	  reports	  (Marchildon	  and	  O'Fee	  2007,	  Marchildon	  and	  Torgerson	  2013).	  	  
	   The	  United	  States	  literature	  is	  quite	  different	  (Okma	  and	  Marmor	  2015).	  
Territorial	  politics	  and	  health,	  as	  a	  topic,	  plays	  to	  the	  strengths	  of	  American	  political	  
science	  with	  its	  interesting	  state-­‐federal	  interactions,	  wealth	  of	  documentation,	  
state	  variation,	  complex	  intergovernmental	  games,	  and	  basically	  constant	  setting	  of	  
the	  US	  federal	  system.	  One	  result	  is	  both	  a	  thriving	  health	  politics	  literature	  on	  state	  
and	  federal	  programs,	  found	  especially	  in	  the	  Journal	  of	  Health	  Politics,	  Policy	  and	  
Law	  and	  Publius.	  It	  includes	  work	  that	  takes	  states	  seriously	  as	  health	  policy	  actors	  
(Fox	  2010,	  Hwang,	  Sharfstein,	  and	  Koller	  2015),	  work	  on	  specific	  states	  and	  their	  
relationship	  with	  federal	  programs	  such	  as	  Medicaid	  (Holahan,	  Weil,	  and	  Wiener	  
2003,	  Thompson	  2012),	  work	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  states	  on	  healthcare	  access	  
(Moynihan,	  Herd,	  and	  Ribgy	  2013)	  and	  inequality	  (Kelly	  and	  Witko	  2012),	  work	  on	  
the	  functional	  specialization	  of	  states	  (Anton	  1997,	  Greer	  and	  Jacobson	  2010),	  and	  a	  
bit	  of	  work,	  ripe	  for	  extension	  and	  testing,	  that	  applies	  general	  themes	  in	  American	  
political	  development,	  such	  as	  the	  role	  of	  federalism	  in	  institutionalizing	  racism,	  in	  
the	  context	  of	  health	  policy	  (Lieberman	  and	  Lapinski	  2001).	  Health	  policy	  
researchers	  are	  probably	  among	  the	  American	  public	  policy	  researchers	  most	  
interested	  in	  states,	  perhaps	  because	  the	  complexity	  and	  expense	  of	  U.S.	  health	  care	  
means	  that	  relatively	  small	  variations	  in	  outcomes	  can	  have	  interesting	  politics	  and	  
big	  consequences.	  	  
A	  second	  result	  is	  writing	  that	  uses	  health	  cases	  with	  theories	  about	  issues	  
that	  interest	  students	  of	  the	  U.S.	  political	  system	  in	  general,	  such	  as	  interstate	  
variation,	  policy	  learning,	  and	  intergovernmental	  relations,	  well	  reviewed	  in	  a	  
slightly	  dated	  article	  by	  Miller	  (Miller	  2004)	  as	  well	  as	  (Gray,	  Lowery,	  and	  Benz	  
2013,	  Weissert	  and	  Weissert	  2012).	  These	  studies	  use	  health	  case	  studies	  and	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broader	  theories	  of	  the	  American	  political	  system	  to	  understand	  events.	  	  Journals	  
such	  as	  State	  Politics	  and	  Policy	  Quarterly	  and	  public	  administration	  journals	  
regularly	  publish	  articles	  on	  states	  that	  use	  health	  issues	  as	  examples.	  	  
The	  passage	  of	  the	  Affordable	  Care	  Act,	  also	  known	  as	  Obamacare,	  has	  
created	  a	  very	  high-­‐stakes	  and	  interesting	  case	  study	  in	  federalism	  in	  US	  health	  care.	  
It	  has	  been	  exploited	  by	  a	  number	  of	  researchers	  (Jones,	  Bradley,	  and	  Oberlander	  
2013,	  Jones,	  Singer,	  and	  Ayanian	  2014,	  Jacobs	  and	  Callaghan	  2013,	  McCann	  2015,	  
Martin,	  Strach,	  and	  Schackman	  2013,	  Béland,	  Rocco,	  and	  Waddan	  2014,	  2016).	  	  
Both	  North	  American	  schools	  might	  be	  envied	  by	  those	  working	  in	  less-­‐
studied	  systems,	  but	  along	  with	  their	  characteristic	  advantages,	  such	  as	  the	  
Canadian	  focus	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  constitutional	  and	  health	  politics	  or	  
interest	  in	  the	  politics	  of	  individual	  provinces,	  come	  characteristic	  disadvantages,	  
such	  as	  the	  lack	  of	  interest	  among	  U.S.	  scholars	  in	  exploring	  the	  generalizability	  of	  
many	  of	  their	  ideas.	  Both	  literatures	  might	  usefully	  be	  mined	  for	  examples	  of	  
possible	  approaches	  to	  federalism	  as	  much	  or	  more	  than	  as	  sources	  of	  theory.	  	  	  
	  
Components	  of	  a	  comparative	  territorial	  politics	  of	  health	  
	  
There	  is	  not	  much	  principled	  reason	  why	  the	  comparative	  territorial	  politics	  of	  
health	  should	  not	  be,	  essentially,	  a	  subfield	  of	  comparative	  territorial	  politics,	  
comparative	  public	  policy,	  or	  comparative	  political	  economy	  in	  general.	  Health	  
might	  be	  more	  complex	  than	  education	  or	  more	  expensive	  than	  cultural	  policy,	  but	  
it	  is	  ultimately	  one	  more	  area	  of	  public	  policy,	  and	  the	  generalists	  in	  charge	  of	  
government	  must	  treat	  it	  as	  such.	  What	  research	  in	  health,	  or	  any	  other	  big	  public	  
policy,	  should	  do	  is	  draw	  our	  attention	  to	  a	  number	  of	  issues	  that	  are	  not	  always	  
handled	  well	  in	  comparative	  territorial	  politics	  or	  comparative	  political	  economy.	  
	   First,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  understand	  territorial	  politics	  without	  understanding	  
the	  most	  expensive	  and	  prominent	  programs	  in	  a	  given	  jurisdiction.	  Most	  
governments	  cannot	  escape	  spending	  a	  huge	  amount	  of	  money	  on	  health	  or	  dealing	  
with	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  credit	  and	  blame.	  Most	  citizens’	  experience	  of,	  for	  example,	  
Scottish	  devolution	  is	  experience	  of	  the	  NHS	  Scotland	  and	  the	  education	  system,	  and	  
that	  means	  Scottish	  politicians	  do	  not	  have	  much	  leeway	  to	  handle	  it	  badly	  (Greer	  et	  
al	  forthcoming).	  Even	  in	  systems	  with	  little	  formal	  regional	  role	  in	  health,	  such	  as	  
Austria	  or	  Germany,	  there	  is	  often	  a	  substantial	  amount	  of	  regional	  expenditure,	  
regional	  administration,	  and	  blame	  or	  credit	  for	  politicians,	  in	  health	  (Mätzke	  and	  
Stöger	  2015,	  Mätzke	  2013).	  Likewise,	  regulating	  any	  health	  system	  is	  a	  major	  
challenge	  and	  an	  opportunity	  for	  students	  of	  regulation.	  	  
Second,	  understanding	  territorial	  politics	  means	  understanding	  the	  politics	  
of	  managing	  large	  public	  sector	  organizations	  such	  as	  health	  systems.	  There	  is	  a	  
tendency	  in	  comparative	  territorial	  politics	  to	  let	  politicians	  set	  the	  agenda,	  with	  
arguments	  about	  competencies,	  symbolic	  politics,	  shifting	  power	  relations	  (e.g.	  with	  
the	  EU),	  and	  high	  profile	  negotiations	  dominating	  political	  research	  as	  much	  as	  
political	  journalism.	  The	  problem	  with	  such	  an	  approach	  is	  that	  we	  cannot	  reduce	  
the	  agendas	  of	  governments	  to	  issues	  connected	  with	  authority	  migration;	  they	  also	  
manage,	  and	  cope	  with	  the	  interest	  groups,	  of	  big	  public	  sectors.	  Starting	  with	  big	  
expenditure	  items	  and	  management	  challenges	  such	  as	  health	  or	  other	  public	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policies	  helps	  us	  avoid	  an	  excessive	  focus	  on	  policy	  areas	  whose	  symbolism	  exceeds	  
their	  actual	  importance.	  	  
Third	  and	  consequently,	  health	  policy	  directs	  us	  to	  be	  specific	  where	  much	  
comparative	  literature	  is	  vague.	  Above	  all	  this	  means	  money,	  where	  academic	  
literature	  is	  often	  remarkably	  hazy	  despite	  its	  importance	  for	  wielding	  power	  or	  
getting	  things	  done	  (e.g.(Loughlin,	  Hendriks,	  and	  Lidström	  2011).	  Even	  when	  the	  
public	  sector	  itself	  is	  hazy	  about	  data,	  whether	  it	  is	  the	  UK’s	  steadily	  diminishing	  
supply	  of	  comparable	  data	  (Greer	  2014,	  Bevan	  et	  al.	  2014)	  or	  the	  outright	  
obfuscation	  about	  Spanish	  intergovernmental	  fiscal	  transfers	  (Gray	  2014),	  it	  is	  
interesting	  to	  know	  which	  kinds	  of	  facts	  elites	  prefer	  to	  hide	  or	  not	  collect	  (Laible	  
forthcoming).	  In	  the	  current	  climate	  of	  austerity,	  such	  research	  is	  necessary	  if	  we	  
are	  to	  get	  an	  understanding	  of	  whether	  austerity	  and	  economic	  contraction	  actually	  
do	  lead	  to	  re-­‐centralization.	  	  
	   With	  these	  reasons	  in	  mind,	  what	  does	  the	  fragmented	  literature	  on	  
territorial	  politics	  and	  health	  seem	  to	  suggest?	  	  
	   Some	  points	  are	  relatively	  basic.	  First,	  the	  formal	  organization	  of	  health	  care	  
matters.	  NHS	  (national	  health	  service	  also	  known	  as	  Beveridge)	  systems,	  in	  which	  
the	  government	  directly	  finances	  and	  frequently	  owns	  health	  systems,	  often	  
decentralize	  much	  health	  care	  responsibility.	  These	  countries	  include	  Australia,	  
Canada,	  Italy,	  Spain	  and	  the	  UK,	  and	  to	  some	  extent	  much	  of	  Latin	  America.	  In	  these	  
systems,	  the	  government	  directly	  finances	  and	  manages	  health	  care,	  and	  the	  
amounts	  of	  money,	  credit,	  and	  blame	  are	  accordingly	  large.	  By	  contrast,	  in	  social	  
health	  insurance	  systems	  (SHI,	  also	  known	  as	  Bismarckian	  systems),	  there	  is	  a	  great	  
deal	  of	  resistance	  to	  formal	  recognition	  of	  the	  role	  of	  territory	  or	  local	  governments.	  
The	  German	  constitutional	  court	  has	  gone	  so	  far	  as	  to	  say	  there	  is	  no	  role	  for	  
territory	  in	  social	  insurance	  (Mätzke	  2013).	  That	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  Bismarckian	  
federal	  states	  such	  as	  Germany	  and	  Austria	  lack	  a	  role	  for	  regional	  governments;	  it	  
just	  means	  that	  their	  often	  considerable	  expenditure	  does	  not	  come	  with	  as	  much	  
power	  or	  legitimacy	  as	  an	  actor	  (Mätzke	  and	  Stöger	  2015).	  Such	  countries	  include	  
Austria,	  Belgium,	  and	  Germany.	  	  Formal	  federal	  status,	  generally	  not	  worth	  
worrying	  about,	  is	  almost	  entirely	  wiped	  out	  by	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  health	  service	  
(e.g.	  the	  role	  of	  government)	  and	  the	  specific	  role,	  powers,	  and	  financing	  of	  regional	  
governments	  (Costa-­‐i-­‐Font	  and	  Greer	  2013).	  
	   Then,	  there	  are	  some	  points	  we	  can	  draw	  from	  the	  comparative	  health	  care	  
federalism	  literature,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  country-­‐specific	  literature	  read	  with	  a	  
comparative,	  generalizable,	  eye.	  Administration	  matters	  a	  great	  deal.	  Much	  of	  what	  
regional	  governments	  do	  in	  health	  is	  administer,	  and	  regional	  administration,	  
measured	  on	  the	  level	  of	  specific	  issues	  (mental	  health,	  cancer,	  public	  health)	  is	  
where	  the	  territorial	  politics	  of	  health	  actually	  produces	  interesting	  results	  for	  
patients	  and	  voters.	  Further,	  examining	  the	  origins	  of	  policies	  addressing	  topics	  
such	  as	  cancer	  care	  or	  health	  inequalities	  will	  generally	  reveal	  more	  territorial	  
politics	  than	  can	  be	  seen	  when	  we	  focus	  only	  on	  regional	  politicians;	  regional	  
medical	  elites,	  political	  entrepreneurs	  and	  others	  start	  to	  matter.	  	  Greater	  attention	  
to	  administrative	  variation	  among	  different	  jurisdictions	  within	  ostensibly	  similar	  
systems	  might	  be	  very	  rewarding.	  
	   10	  
	   The	  sheer	  cost	  of	  health	  also	  means	  that	  health	  systems,	  regardless	  of	  the	  
specific	  financing	  system,	  are	  a	  permanent	  problem	  to	  finance	  ministers.	  In	  
decentralized	  NHS	  systems,	  in	  particular,	  they	  are	  a	  laboratory	  to	  examine	  what	  
effective	  central	  control	  might	  look	  like	  (better	  than	  education,	  which	  often	  has	  
substantial	  local	  political	  authority).	  What	  broadly	  emerges	  is	  that	  money	  is	  more	  
powerful	  than	  law.	  Decentralized	  countries	  are	  littered	  with	  efforts	  to	  set	  standards	  
and	  compare	  outcomes.	  Not	  only	  is	  comparative	  data	  something	  politicians	  tend	  to	  
resist	  the	  effects	  are	  unpredictable	  and	  quality	  often	  debated.	  As	  for	  laws,	  even	  the	  
most	  effective,	  such	  as	  the	  Canada	  Health	  Act,	  probably	  gain	  most	  of	  their	  force	  from	  
the	  political	  consequences	  of	  disobeying	  them	  rather	  than	  the	  likelihood	  of	  the	  
federal	  government	  enforcing	  them	  in	  court.	  There	  are	  cases	  of	  patients	  litigating	  a	  
right	  to	  health,	  as	  is	  happening	  in	  Brazil	  right	  now,	  but	  in	  general	  laws	  are	  
guidelines	  for	  negotiations	  and	  money	  is	  what	  actually	  matters.	  Thus,	  for	  example,	  
the	  Brazilian	  federal	  government	  was	  able	  to	  create	  a	  welfare	  state	  through	  
conditional	  grants	  to	  regional	  and	  local	  governments	  despite	  a	  federal	  constitution	  
that	  should	  have	  blocked	  it	  (Arretche	  2013,	  Arretche	  and	  Massard	  da	  Fonseca	  
2014).	  Equally,	  various	  Spanish	  central	  government	  efforts	  to	  shape	  health	  care	  
quality	  were	  generally	  ineffective	  in	  the	  good	  times,	  but	  enforcement	  of	  austerity	  
since	  2010	  in	  Spain	  has	  constrained	  regional	  governments	  while	  leaving	  them	  with	  
much	  of	  the	  blame	  for	  the	  resulting	  cutbacks.	  In	  general,	  the	  experience	  of	  health	  
suggests	  that	  money,	  especially	  conditional	  grants,	  is	  more	  important	  than	  law,	  and	  
characterizing	  law	  accurately	  means	  viewing	  it	  as	  part	  of	  a	  debate	  rather	  than	  an	  
agreement.	  	  
	   Health	  policy	  also	  suggests	  that	  local	  media	  are	  very	  important.	  As	  traditional	  
print	  and	  broadcast	  media	  decline	  and	  new	  media	  rise,	  the	  media	  are	  also	  hard	  to	  
characterize.	  The	  health	  sector	  is	  a	  “dripping	  roast	  for	  the	  local	  media,”	  as	  a	  health	  
manager	  in	  Scotland	  once	  said	  to	  me,	  and	  the	  result	  is	  that	  if	  there	  is	  a	  local	  media	  
there	  is	  an	  erratic	  but	  energetic	  source	  of	  accountability	  and	  pressure	  on	  ministers.	  
Given	  that	  most	  patients	  and	  voters	  have	  very	  little	  idea	  of	  the	  quality	  of	  their	  
personal	  health	  care,	  let	  alone	  their	  health	  system,	  the	  presence,	  absence,	  and	  
behavior	  of	  the	  media	  is	  important.	  Not	  least,	  the	  media	  shapes	  the	  likelihood	  that	  a	  
decentralized	  health	  system	  reaps	  the	  benefits	  of	  accountability	  and	  public	  
engagement	  that	  the	  more	  optimistic	  theorists	  of	  decentralization	  like	  to	  impute	  
(Costa-­‐i-­‐Font	  and	  Greer	  2013,	  Palley	  and	  Fierlbeck	  2015).	  
	   Finally,	  health	  care	  politics	  reminds	  us	  that	  parties	  are	  not	  the	  only	  networks.	  
The	  role	  of	  political	  parties	  in	  tying	  together	  disparate	  politicians,	  aligning	  their	  
interests,	  and	  sorting	  out	  preferences,	  is	  well	  established	  across	  political	  science	  
including	  territorial	  politics.	  But	  the	  role	  of	  parties	  in	  formal	  politics	  should	  not	  
blind	  us	  to	  the	  role	  of	  similar	  kinds	  of	  networks	  in	  less	  formal	  politics.	  Medical	  
organization	  and	  practice	  is	  often	  shaped	  by	  guidelines	  whose	  production	  is	  just	  as	  
political,	  and	  subject	  to	  legal,	  interest	  group,	  and	  political	  influence	  as	  any	  law.	  
Pressure	  to	  improve	  the	  credentials	  of	  nurses,	  save	  premature	  infants	  at	  23	  weeks,	  
or	  adopt	  certain	  health	  education	  policies	  are	  likely	  to	  both	  move	  outside	  formal	  
politics	  and	  manifest	  themselves	  via	  formal,	  often	  regional,	  decisions	  whose	  origins	  
will	  not	  be	  clear	  if	  we	  confine	  ourselves	  to	  the	  study	  of	  formal	  politics.	  The	  most	  
powerful	  kinds	  of	  political	  engagement	  often	  come	  in	  the	  form	  of	  ostensibly	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apolitical	  science	  (Jasanoff	  2004b).	  It	  might	  be	  that	  local	  and	  regional	  governments	  
are	  especially	  good	  places	  for	  such	  politico-­‐scientific	  action	  to	  take	  place	  (Fox	  2013).	  
The	  implication	  is	  that	  if	  political	  scientists	  ignore	  the	  politics	  of	  medicine	  and	  
public	  health,	  they	  will	  not	  just	  fail	  to	  understand	  what	  politicians	  and	  officials	  do	  
most	  of	  the	  day;	  they	  will	  also	  mis-­‐characterize	  the	  motivations	  and	  actions	  of	  many	  
of	  the	  players	  they	  do	  study.	  
	  
Conclusion:	  Possible	  directions	  
	  
Fierlbeck	  and	  Palley	  write	  that	  the	  “study	  of	  health	  care	  federalism	  is	  
underrepresented	  in	  the	  field	  of	  comparative	  political	  science…there	  are	  very	  few	  
systematic	  studies	  which	  focus	  on	  the	  dynamics	  between	  federal	  and	  regional	  
governments	  (and	  between	  regional	  governments)	  across	  a	  number	  of	  federal	  
states”	  (Fierlbeck	  and	  Palley	  2015b)(p1).	  	  So	  far,	  the	  people	  trying	  to	  address	  this	  
gap	  are	  mostly	  political	  scientists	  solidly	  grounded	  in	  health	  knowledge,	  and	  the	  
findings	  are	  cumulating	  slowly.	  There	  has	  been	  little	  reciprocal	  attention	  from	  more	  
general	  political	  science,	  since	  public	  policy	  in	  general	  has	  not	  been	  seen	  as	  an	  easy	  
way	  to	  develop	  knowledge	  about	  formal	  politics	  and	  institutions.	  The	  best	  dialogues	  
are	  in	  the	  different	  North	  American	  political	  science	  worlds,	  but	  their	  
generalizability,	  as	  against	  inspirational	  value,	  remains	  to	  be	  seen.	  	  
One	  basic	  direction	  is	  to	  ask	  what	  the	  study	  of	  health	  can	  do	  for	  comparative	  
territorial	  politics.	  Here,	  the	  question	  is	  what	  established	  topics	  in	  territorial	  politics	  
might	  benefit	  from	  research	  in	  health	  policy.	  One	  topic	  in	  comparative	  territorial	  
politics	  that	  has	  been	  frustrating	  but	  might	  be	  well	  addressed	  with	  additional	  
research	  in	  health	  is	  the	  study	  of	  how	  policies	  are	  adopted	  in	  different	  jurisdictions,	  
whether	  we	  call	  it	  policy	  transfer,	  learning,	  diffusion,	  or	  something	  else.	  This	  has	  
been	  a	  frustrating	  literature	  in	  which	  political	  scientists	  have	  made	  at	  best	  slow	  
theoretical	  progress	  (Boushey	  2010).	  Study	  of	  how	  ideas	  appear	  in	  different	  regions	  
might	  be	  a	  way	  to	  trace	  the	  relative	  influence	  of	  government	  to	  government	  
learning,	  professional	  and	  political	  networks	  that	  carry	  ideas,	  and	  more	  functionalist	  
arguments-­‐	  in	  other	  words,	  we	  could	  pick	  up	  where	  Baumgartner	  and	  Jones	  left	  off	  
in	  their	  studies	  of	  interlinked	  agendas	  within	  the	  U.S.	  federal	  system	  (Baumgartner	  
and	  Jones	  1993,	  Lowery,	  Gray,	  and	  Baumgartner	  2010,	  Shipan	  and	  Volden	  2008).	  	  
A	  second	  topic	  where	  health	  data	  might	  be	  particularly	  useful	  would	  emerge	  
if	  we	  could	  couple	  more	  detailed	  budget	  and	  eligibility	  data	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  
the	  response	  of	  different	  territorial	  political	  systems	  to	  issues	  such	  as	  ageing	  
societies	  or	  “new	  social	  risks”	  (Greer	  2018,	  Greer,	  Elliott,	  and	  Oliver	  2015).	  How	  
does	  the	  allocation	  of	  power	  in	  different	  systems,	  such	  as	  the	  degree	  of	  regional	  self-­‐
rule	  and	  shared	  rule,	  produce	  different	  kinds	  of	  social	  policy	  results	  and	  empower	  
different	  interests?	  	  How	  do	  the	  designs	  of	  health	  systems	  reflect,	  or	  fail	  to	  reflect,	  
the	  neat	  functionalist	  models	  associated	  with	  the	  economics	  of	  fiscal	  federalism?	  
One	  study	  (Adolph,	  Greer,	  and	  Massard	  da	  Fonseca	  2012)	  found	  that	  the	  answer	  
was:	  surprisingly	  well.	  That,	  in	  turn,	  raises	  the	  questions	  about	  why	  such	  
isomorphism	  might	  exist.	  Could	  economists,	  with	  their	  functionalist	  approach,	  be	  
right	  about	  the	  evolution	  of	  federations?	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Another	  way	  to	  think	  about	  future	  research	  directions	  is	  to	  ask	  what	  the	  
study	  of	  comparative	  territorial	  politics	  can	  do	  for	  research	  in	  health	  policy	  (Greer	  
and	  Massard	  da	  Fonseca	  2015).	  	  This	  question	  is,	  in	  a	  sense,	  easy	  because	  there	  is	  so	  
much	  excluded	  from	  the	  technocratic	  and	  strangely	  apolitical	  global	  health	  policy	  
literature	  on	  decentralization.	  There	  are	  some	  basic	  points	  that	  are	  easily	  made	  and	  
need	  to	  be	  made.	  For	  example,	  decentralization	  or	  federalism	  is	  often	  so	  well	  
established	  as	  to	  not	  be	  debatable,	  or	  is	  a	  condition	  for	  keeping	  a	  country	  together.	  
Contemplating	  the	  advisability	  of	  federalism	  in	  Belgium	  or	  Canada	  is	  beside	  the	  
point.	  Likewise,	  distinguishing	  between	  elected	  and	  unelected	  governments	  is	  
absolutely	  basic	  to	  political	  science,	  but	  is	  a	  distinction	  not	  reliably	  made	  in	  health	  
policy	  literature.	  In	  short,	  there	  is	  an	  enormous	  opportunity	  for	  arbitrage	  between	  
political	  science	  and	  health	  policy	  studies.	  	  
	   Then	  there	  are	  simply	  unexplored	  areas	  of	  inquiry.	  Almost	  the	  entire	  
discussion	  above	  has	  focused,	  along	  with	  the	  literature,	  on	  health	  care.	  The	  broader	  
area	  of	  public	  health-­‐	  the	  field	  of	  prevention	  of	  disease-­‐	  receives	  almost	  no	  attention	  
from	  any	  political	  scientist	  (for	  a	  few	  laudable	  exceptions,	  (Lillvis,	  Kirkland,	  and	  
Frick	  2014,	  Kurzer	  2012).	  This	  means	  that	  political	  science	  foregoes	  a	  fascinating	  
policy	  area,	  one	  quite	  unlike	  the	  high	  spending	  area	  of	  health	  care,	  with	  especially	  
interesting	  intergovernmental	  divisions	  of	  labor	  (Adolph,	  Greer,	  and	  Massard	  da	  
Fonseca	  2012).	  One	  almost	  entirely	  unexplored	  area,	  which	  might	  the	  most	  
comparable	  across	  the	  diverse	  federations	  of	  the	  world,	  is	  communicable	  disease	  
control	  (Greer	  and	  Mätzke	  2012,	  Greer	  2015).	  Equally,	  the	  comparative	  study	  of	  
how	  different	  governments	  try	  to	  shape	  their	  populations’	  health	  and	  behavior,	  
including	  public	  health	  interventions,	  is	  neglected.	  Tobacco	  control,	  for	  example,	  is	  
almost	  impossible	  to	  understand	  without	  considering	  the	  interplay	  of	  local	  and	  
regional	  action	  and	  international	  networks	  (Asare,	  Cairney,	  and	  Studlar	  2009,	  
Jarman	  2014,	  Duina	  and	  Kurzer	  2004,	  Shipan	  and	  Volden	  2006,	  2008).	  
Political	  scientists’	  understanding	  of	  health	  care,	  which	  tends	  to	  be	  most	  
interested	  in	  financing,	  legislation,	  and	  regulation,	  also	  leaves	  aside	  at	  least	  one	  
great	  and	  largely	  unexplored	  hypothesis.	  That	  is	  historian	  Daniel	  Fox’s	  concept	  of	  
“hierarchical	  regionalism”	  as	  a	  theme	  of	  UK	  and	  US	  health	  policy	  in	  the	  twentieth	  
century	  (Fox	  1986,	  Webster	  1990).	  Fox	  argued	  that	  comparative	  and	  historical	  
literature	  focused	  on	  the	  question	  of	  coverage	  entitlements	  missed	  the	  fact	  that	  
health	  care	  leaders,	  particularly	  doctors,	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  engaged	  in	  furious	  
contests	  about	  the	  organization	  of	  health	  care-­‐	  in	  particular,	  lining	  up	  for	  and	  
against	  the	  hierarchical	  regionalist	  idea	  that	  health	  care	  should	  be	  organized	  
regionally	  around	  major	  teaching	  and	  academic	  research	  facilities.	  This	  thesis	  has	  
not	  redirected	  research	  away	  from	  the	  politics	  of	  health	  care	  entitlements,	  but	  
deserves	  exploration	  as	  a	  factor	  in	  understanding	  the	  thinking	  of	  health	  care	  
policymakers	  about	  regionalism	  of	  all	  sorts.	  Political	  scientists	  like	  to	  discuss	  health	  
care	  access	  and	  finance,	  but	  are	  often	  deaf	  to	  the	  actual	  politics	  that	  matter	  to	  key	  
people	  in	  the	  game.	  As	  a	  result,	  there	  is	  tremendous	  scope	  for	  research	  into	  the	  
interaction	  between	  health	  politics	  and	  territorial	  politics	  that	  takes	  the	  complexity	  
of	  health	  politics	  seriously.	  	  
Health	  is	  expensive	  and	  deeply	  interesting	  to	  citizens	  and	  the	  press.	  That	  
makes	  it	  a	  core	  preoccupation	  of	  any	  politicians	  with	  health	  policy	  responsibilities.	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But	  it	  has	  not	  received	  the	  attention	  that	  it	  deserves	  from	  political	  scientists	  who	  
strive	  to	  understand	  territorial	  politics.	  Avoiding	  the	  expense,	  policy	  intricacies,	  
lobbying,	  puzzling	  issues	  and	  management	  challenges	  of	  health	  policy	  is	  a	  luxury	  
that	  many	  politicians	  do	  not	  get,	  and	  political	  scientists	  should	  therefore	  not	  indulge	  
themselves	  either	  if	  they	  hope	  to	  understand	  the	  rise	  and	  fall	  of	  governments,	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